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  I. Introduction:
The consensus that has emerged from empirical research holds that central bank
intervention in foreign exchange markets is largely ineffective.  Overall, researchers have
not found robust relationships between official transactions and exchange rates consistent
with either monetary, or portfolio-balance theories of exchange-rate determination.
However, much research suggests that intervention might sometimes affect exchange
rates and that the impact might be related to informational asymmetries.
This is different from the treatment of information in previous work.  For
example, in early work, Mussa (1981) suggested that authorities might use intervention to
signal (e.g. provide information about) future monetary policies.  Even studies that view
intervention as altering portfolios of government bonds denominated in different
currencies make assumptions about the information available to investors.  Recent work
focuses more directly on informational assumptions and market microstructure.
The perception that intervention’s impact is not robust is perhaps reflected in the
sharp reduction in the frequency of U.S. monetary authorities interventions since the early
1990s (see figure 1).  Between February 1987 and July 1990—the period associated with
the Louvre Accord—the United States intervened on 235 occasions, approximately on
one out of every four business days.  Over the next 3 years, the United States intervened
on only 38 times or on 3 percent of the business days.  (Both of these episodes, however,
pale in comparison with the frequency of U.S. intervention during the late 1970s and
early 1980s.)  Despite record breaking signal days of intervention, the average amount3
transacted on a day of intervention, has increased from $188 million in the late 1980s to
$418 million in the 1990s (see figures 2 and 3). Since August 1995, the United States has
intervened only once.  Moreover, events in 1989 and early 1990—when FOMC members
complained that intervention sales of foreign exchange confused the markets about the
Committee’s desire to tighten monetary policy—offered tacit official acknowledgement
of intervention’s prospective influence on expectations.
This short survey discusses newer research analyzing informational aspects of
intervention.  It is intended to complement surveys by Edison (1993), Almekinders (1995)
and Dominguez and Frankel (1993) and to suggest possible directions for further
research.  We focus on issues, rather than techniques, and focus on work published since
Edison’s survey (1993). Section 1 defines intervention and distinguishes between
sterilized and nonsterilized intervention.  After briefly discussing asymmetric information
in financial markets, section 2 discusses intervention as a signal of monetary policy and
as a source of information more broadly.  Section 2 also considers the connection
between technical trading rules and intervention profits, as well as exchange-rate
volatility.  Section 3 reviews institutional aspects of U.S. intervention and the
interpretation of reports of intervention. Section 4 concludes with a summary of what we
know about sterilized intervention, and what needs to be learned.
  II.  Intervention, Sterilization, and Fundamentals.
We will define exchange-market intervention as official purchases and sales of
foreign currencies that the monetary authorities undertake to influence the exchange value
of currencies.  This definition excludes other types of national policies, notably monetary4
policy and ‘jawboning,’ that might affect exchange rates.  The definition also delimits the
motives underlying official foreign-exchange transactions.  Central banks occasionally
buy or sell foreign exchange for reasons other than influencing exchange rates.  Between
May and July 1990, for example, the United States undertook 17 sales of German marks
to adjust the Treasury’s portfolio.  These transactions, which may affect exchange rates,
do not constitute intervention by our definition.
1
As just defined, intervention differs from a standard open-market operation only
in terms of the instruments traded by the central bank, and like any open-market
operations, intervention has the potential to alter the monetary base.  This poses no
particular problem for monetary policymakers when the exchange rate and inflation
objectives of monetary policy are compatible, but it raises an important question that has
received little attention: Do such interventions alter the effectiveness of a change in
monetary policy on the exchange rate?  Bonser-Neal, et.al. (1998) find that including
measures of Federal Reserve interventions does not affect the response of exchange-rates
to federal-funds-rate target changes.  To the extent that intervention does not modify the
impact of a consistent open-market operation on exchange rates, it would seem to be a
redundant policy instrument.
Since the exchange rate and inflation objectives of monetary policy are often not
necessarily compatible, the Federal Reserve sterilizes the intervention through offsetting
open-market operations whenever U.S. interventions threaten to compromise its federal-
                                                
1 Official Federal Reserve System intervention data does not always exclude such
transactions. However, it is not clear that the newspapers or other media are able to
distinguish these from other official foreign exchange transactions.5
fund target.
2  As Glick and Hutchison (1999) report, the German and Japanese
interventions are similarly sterilized, at least in the short-run.
Sterilized intervention is ineffective within the standard monetary model of
exchange-rate determination.  The process of sterilizing intervention, however, alters the
amount of publicly held government debt, and therefore could affect exchange rates
through a portfolio-balance channel. Direct examination of the portfolio balance
mechanism requires data on holdings of government securities and thus is limited to
monthly frequencies or lower. The most recent such study is Dominguez and Frankel
(1993b) who find significant impacts of U.S. and German intervention in the early 1980s.
However, Edison (1993)’s comprehensive survey of this approach reports many findings
of statistical or economical insignificance.
III.  Sterilized Intervention and Expectations
The well-known empirical shortcomings of standard macro-models of exchange-
rate determination and evidence that technical trading rules can generate excess profits
has heightened interest in the role of information and in the microstructure of foreign
exchange markets. We suggest that it is useful to view recent work on intervention within
this framework.
As Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) have argued, if information is costly, markets
prices cannot continuously reflect all available information, implying that informationally
                                                
2  Notice that the issue of sterilization becomes a bit murky if the FOMC sets its federal-
funds-rate target to achieve an exchange-rate objective.  Researchers should probably
always attempt to control for monetary policy changes when investigating the
effectiveness of intervention, even though the Federal Reserve routinely sterilizes
intervention.6
efficient markets, ala Fama (1970), must breakdown.
3  Prices will instead reflect
information up to the point were the marginal benefits from acquiring and trading on
information equal the marginal costs. Access to information differentiates traders, while
random shocks mask public information and heighten asymmetries.  In such a market,
prices perform a dual role of describing the terms of trade and of transferring information
from more, to less informed agents.  Knowledgeable traders may behave strategically,
however, further distorting the information in prices (see Admati 1991).
The volume of foreign exchange trading, estimated at more than $1.2 trillion per
day, seems large relative to the volume of cross-border commercial transaction.  Much of
this trading (including market making) is speculative, resulting necessarily from
heterogeneous information.  Numerous papers offer evidence in favor of asymmetric
information in foreign exchange markets. Ito (1993), for example, finds that survey data
imply that expectations are not homogeneous.  Ito, Lyons, and Melvin (1998) find
evidence of private information in the change in intradaily volatility patterns subsequent
to the introduction of lunchtime trading in the Tokyo foreign exchange market. Goldberg
and Frydman (1996) show that ‘theories consistent expectations’ can generate exchange-
rate patterns more consistent with observed exchange-rate behavior than can the
assumption of rational-expectations.  This literature suggests new mechanisms through
which intervention might provide information to the market, or at least a reformulation of
                                                
3  Even if the foreign-exchange market were perfectly efficient, differences in risk
aversion and wealth could produce unexploited profit opportunities.7
the sense in which authorities have a clearer understanding than some private traders of
market conditions.
4
Signaling Future Monetary Policies
Early work on signaling followed Mussa (1981) who suggested that central banks
might signal future changes in monetary policy through interventions, with sales or
purchases of foreign exchange implying, respectively, monetary tightening or ease.  Such
signals could be particularly credible because the intervention would give the monetary
authorities an open position in a foreign currency that would result in a loss if they failed
to validate their signals.  Of course, when validated these intervention signals are not
sterilized.  They consequently do not provide monetary authorities with an independent
influence over exchange rates.  Several empirical investigations (discussed below) have
cast doubt on the efficacy of this mechanism for intervention.
Reeves (1997) presents a theoretical model where the central bank faces a tradeoff
between meeting targets for the exchange rate and money. Key parameters determining
the response of the exchange rate to intervention relate to the extent of credibility and
deviations from rational expectations.  She concludes that only partial credibility justifies
the use of costly foreign exchange intervention. Unlike most signaling theories, here the
size of the intervention influences the market’s response.
5
Policy signaling is effective only if the market did not already anticipate a
monetary-policy change.  Expectations about future monetary policy can be measured
                                                
4  Bhattachary and Weller (1997) also note that central banks might use intervention in
the short run to bring about an exchange rate that is inconsistent with market
fundamentals.  This would, however, dissipate their future ability to signal.8
with data on federal funds futures. Evidence from this market suggests that participants
anticipate policy moves fairly accurately within a two-month horizons (see Carlson, et. al.
1995).  The largest prediction errors occur around monetary-policy reversals.  Hutchison
and Fatama (1999) show that dollar interventions between 1989 and 1993 did not signal
changes in future monetary policy since they were not correlated with changes in federal-
funds-futures. However, the conditional variance of federal funds futures increased,
suggesting that intervention increases uncertainty about future policy.  In constrast,
Bonser-Neal et.al. (1998) find evidence that intervention, cumulative over the previous
two weeks, signals future changes in the federal funds target rate between 1987 and
1994.
6
Lewis (1995) also offers evidence that intervention affects the federal funds rate
and various monetary variables, but because the significance and the signs of the
estimated coefficients are sensitive to the measurement horizon and lag structure, the
results do not unambiguously support monetary signaling.  Lewis also finds some
evidence of reverse causation—changes in monetary variables predict offsetting changes
in intervention.
Kaminsky and Lewis (1996) provide evidence that intervention predicts future
monetary policies, but the sign is opposite that implied by the signaling hypothesis.  They
also find that when intervention is supported by consistent movements in monetary
                                                                                                                                                
5 Klein (1989) found disproportionate impacts of ‘small’ interventions.
6 An explanation for these starkly different results over a similar time period might
focus on cumulative intervention.  Does cumulative interventions convey a stronger or
more credible signal than one-day interventions?  If intervention does not signal changes
in the federal funds rate, does it signal monetary reversals?9
policy, exchange rates tend to respond in the expected direction, but when intervention is
followed by inconsistent monetary policy, exchange rate tend to move in the opposite
direction.  This highlights the essential ambiguity in the signaling story: If intervention
only works when it is consistent with monetary policy, what policy information does
intervention add?
Signaling In General
There are other signaling mechanisms beyond the one highlighted in the previous
section. More generally, if the central bank has consistently better information than do
private traders, intervention might cause them to modify their prior estimates of the
distribution of exchange-rate changes.  Dominguez and Frankel (1993a) provided
evidence that news reports of intervention and official policy statement during the 1980s
had the ‘intended’ effect on the Deustchemark/Dollar exchange rate. While several other
studies are consistent with this possibility, none specify the information being
transmitted.
Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) construct a theoretical, asymmetric-information
model of the foreign exchange market that explicitly incorporates intervention.  In their
model, the central bank can make accurate inferences about speculators’ private
information, and speculators get better—but incomplete—information from observing the
interventions of the central bank.  This model has several implications that are consistent
with empirical findings.  For one, the sensitivity of the exchange rate to an intervention is
not necessarily constant.  Second, the sign of the response of the exchange rate depends10
on the relative precision of the market’s information about the exchange-rate target and
market fundamentals.
7
Humpage (1999) tested whether the Federal Reserve routinely had better
information about exchange-rate movements than the market by counting successful
interventions for three years following the Louvre Accord.  The frequency of success was
relatively low, imply that U.S. intervention generally lack forecast value.   The sole
exception was intervention as a predictor that recent exchange rate movements would
moderate, but not reverse (leaning against the wind).  Humpage found, however, that
coordination and, possibly, the amount of intervention increased the probability of
success.
8  Murray, Zelmer and McManus (1996) and Beattie and Fillion (1999) use the
existence of a ‘non-intervention band’ for the Bank of Canada to distinguish between
expected and unexpected intervention.  Murray, Zelmer, and McManus (1996) find that
expected intervention failed to reduce the implied volatility of the Canadian dollar/US
dollar exchange rate the day after intervention but that unexpectedly heavy intervention
might be effective.  Beattie and Fillion (1999) confirm this finding with intradaily data.
Researchers know little about the duration of an intervention’s impact on spot
exchange rates.  Osler (1998) shows that speculators cause transitory shocks to exchange
rates—like interventions—to die out slowly.  Baillie and Osterberg (1997a) find evidence
consistent with intervention affecting a risk premium in 30-day forward rates. Using high
                                                
7 A “perverse” coefficient could be consistent with a “leaning against the wind”
intervention strategy. Another possible explanation for the “perverse” coefficients
reported in Dominguez and Frankel (1993) or in Humpage (1989),  is a failure to control
for simultaneity between exchange rates and intervention in high frequency data
8 This raises the questions as to what constitutes a successful intervention?11
frequency data, Dominguez (1997) finds that G3 intervention significantly affected dollar
exchange rates, but that Japanese intervention did not affect the yen-dollar rate.  She
found evidence of mean reversion following Fed intervention, which was completed on
average within 3 hours.  This suggests that the impact of intervention is temporary.
Peiers (1997) analyzes the flow of asymmetric information around announcements
of Bundesbank intervention.  She assumes that the Bundesbank intervenes through
Deutsche Bank, the primary market maker in the mark-dollar market, and finds that the
Deutsche Bank is a temporary price leader among less well informed commercial banks.
Specifically, Deutsche Bank’s price adjustments Granger cause other commercial banks’
price changes, especially up to 60 minutes prior to the Reuters report of intervention.
Technical Trading Rules and Intervention Profits
A substantial number of studies have found that fairly simple technical trading
rules—including ex ante rules, as in Neely, Weller, and Ditmar (1997)—generate profits
that are difficult to explain in terms of standard risk measures.
9  Profits generated from
technical trading rules are consistent with asymmetric information.  LeBaron (1999), and
Neely and Weller (1997) have shown that technical trading rules generate excess returns
during periods of central bank intervention.  Szakmary and Mathur (1997) associate
technical trading rule profits with “leaning against the wind” intervention.  If central
banks smooth out, but do not reverse, exchange-rate movements, they will inevitably
                                                
9  Osler (1996) suggests that more elaborate trading rules largely mimic much simpler
rules.12
sustain valuation losses.
10  By taking a position opposite that of the central bank,
technical traders apparently stand to profit.
As Sweeney (1997) notes if central banks have better information than the market,
then they should be consistently able to earn profits on their interventions.  Sweeney
(1996a) finds that on a risk adjusted basis, central banks did not incur losses (and
probably made profits).  Leahy (1995) demonstrates that on balance from March 1973
through December 1992, the Federal Reserve earned economically significant profits
from its intervention.  His calculations include valuation adjustments and net interest
earning over opportunity cost.
11  Leahy’s analysis of profits suggests superior Federal
Reserve forecasting ability.
Neely (1998) reconciles the technical trading results with Leahy’s profit
calculations by showing that intervention profits occur over a longer time horizon than
technical trading profits.  In the short-run, intervention often generates losses, a point that
Goodhart and Hesse (1993) also illustrate.  Hence, it is possible that technical traders
profit against the central bank in the short-run, while central banks profit in the long-term.
Further work on these seemingly anomalous results is warranted.
Volatility
An often stated objective of intervention is to calm disorderly markets, which
many researchers have interpreted as reducing conditional (expected) variance. The time
series of most exchange rates exhibits distinct periods of high and low volatility with
                                                
10  Despite assertions to the contrary, unprofitable central bank interevtion is not
necessarily destabilizing.  The is only true if the fundamental equilibrium rate is constant.13
some persistence.  Moreover, exchange rate changes have leptokurtotic distributions, with
more of the probability mass bunching in the tails of the distribution than a normal
distribution would predict.  This pattern is possibly consistent with distinct configurations
of information flows in the market.  Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) consider a theoretical
model with informed traders (speculators) and liquidity traders (driven by customer
orders).  In their model, periods of high variance correspond to periods of high
concentrations of knowledgeable traders and of information exchange.  Periods of low
information suggest that information is more homogeneous.  Consistent with this
theoretical model, Hsieh and Kleidon (1996) show that intraday volatility may reflect
market learning at the beginning of the day and inventory management by dealers at the
end of the day.  In a study of dollar-German mark futures prices, Ederington and Lee
(1993) found that intraday and day of the week volatility patterns were mainly due to the
timing of major macroeconomic announcements.  Although most of the price adjustment
occurs within the first minute, volatility remains considerably higher than normal for
another fifteen minutes, or so, and slightly higher than normal for several hours.
Change and Taylor (1998), Baillie and Osterberg (1997b), Bonser-Neal and
Tanner (1996), Huang (1997) and Dominguez (1993) find evidence that intervention
tends to increase exchange-rate volatility.  Galati and Melick (1999) derive the
probability of one-month forward exchange rates from option prices and find that
perceived intervention increases the variance of the expected future exchange rate, but not
its skewness nor the kurtosis of the process.  Using a simple theoretical model of
                                                                                                                                                
11  As Leahy notes, if interest rate differentials compensates for valuation losses, a
leaning-against-the-wind strategy could be profitable.14
speculative behaviour, Szpiro (1994) suggest that strong interventions could produce
chaotic exchange-rate dynamics.  While these findings might be made consistent with
theoretical models such as Admati and Pfleiderer, much further work is necessary to
develop the connection between intervention, volatility, and the objectives of exchange-
rate policy.
IV. Implementation of Intervention Policies
The nature and amount of information conveyed by central bank foreign exchange
intervention depends partly on the way in which such policies are implemented. Three
aspects of the institutional setup in the United States might be explored. First, the way in
which the transactions are carried out makes it unlikely that all market participants have
equal and immediate information about details of the transactions.
12 This has been
discussed by Dominguez and Frankel (1993a) and also by Osterberg and Wetmore-
Humes (1993, 1995). Second, it is possible that intervention authorities do not seek to
signal in quite the manner suggested by academic economists. Rather they might operate
directly through trading rule signals or other indicators of the market’s strength and
tendencies.  Hung (1997) has explored this possibility for the U.S.  Third, since both the
U.S. Treasury (through its Exchange Stabilization Fund) and the Federal Reserve System
are involved in intervention operations, the relation between the two agencies may be
relevant to the interpretation of U.S. interventions. This has been discussed at length by
Humpage (1994) and by Todd (1992).
                                                
12 The model proposed by Bhattacharya and Weller (1977) has among its implications
that the central bank might not want to reveal the scale of its intervention operations.15
U.S. foreign exchange intervention is implemented through a trading desk at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY).  Not surprisingly, the interventions are not
announced in advance but rather the market is usually expected to circulate information
about the official activities.  This information might include not just the amount of the
official transaction but also hints of official intentions.
The FRBNY maintains routine contact with counterparties through whom it might
conduct official transactions.  Potential counterparties are obligated to be available to
FRBNY representatives in the early morning to discuss market developments. This
contact provides part of the information that the Fed uses to determine any course of
official action and also provides opportunity to hint at official intentions.  Obviously the
Fed can follow and assess the market’s anticipations of official actions.
The list of potential counterparties is not publicly available. However, there is
some reason to believe that it can be closely proxied by the membership of the Foreign
Exchange Committee (FEC).  The FEC includes commercial banks, brokers, and others
with a presence in the foreign exchanges markets.  It also includes as officers two
FRBNY representatives.  Among its major activities is the publication, every three years,
of a survey of developments in the foreign exchange markets.
Once the U.S. officials have decided to trade foreign currency, a subset of the list
of counterparties is chosen. The next intervention presumably starts farther down the list.
Although the list is not public information there might well be reputational benefits to
being perceived to be on it.  Thus there might be reputational costs associated with being
removed from it.16
If the counterparty with which an order has been placed is a commercial bank
acting as a dealer, then it is expected to report to the market the fact that the Fed has
placed on order.  On the other hand, if the Federal Reserve operates through the brokers’
market with a commercial bank as its agent, then the presence of the Fed presumably
would not be reported to the market.  Dominguez and Frankel (1993a) have equated the
distinction between the two types of intervention to a distinction between public and
‘secret’ intervention and have claimed to find that the later is less effective.  However, the
distinction might not be quite so clear.  First, although counterparties in the first group are
expected to inform the market, they might do so only after a delay, albeit at the risk of
some sort of official sanction.  Second, it is far from clear that the information, once
conveyed by the placing of an official transaction directly with a commercial bank is
circulated evenly through the market.
Skepticism about the assumption that information about intervention circulates
evenly through the market might be supported by consideration of the information
reported by newspapers.  Klein (1993), Dominguez and Frankel (1993), and Osterberg
and Wetmore-Humes (1993, 1995) have each tabulated newspaper reports of intervention
and have compared them to official data.  (The results are not always consistent across
surveys.)  Moreover, newspaper reports of intervention activity are quite ambiguous,
often failing to mention the currencies involved or the specific countries.  The exact
amount is seldom mentioned and the different newspapers often do not report the same
information about intervention.  Since the newspapers reputedly contact market
participants directly and routinely, wide disparity among the newspaper reports appears
inconsistent with the view that accurate information about intervention circulates quickly17
and evenly through the market.  The unavailability of official data on details such as the
exact time and individual amounts of intervention is unfortunate given the recent
proliferation of theoretical analyses of the microstructure of foreign exchange markets
and interest in the transmission of information.
One alternative to coding newspaper reports might be to utilize information
reported by wire services. However, since no individual counterparty necessarily knows
the total amount of the intervention it is not clear how to interpret such reports, which
have been analyzed by Goodhart and Hesse (1993).  Anecdotal evidence suggests that
those reporting to the wire services prepare an estimate of the total intervention based not
only on their involvement but also on whatever knowledge they might have of other
transactions.  Since there have been few tabulations of wire service reports of
intervention, it is difficult to evaluate the empirical significance of any inaccuracy in the
wire service reports.
Peier’s (1997) analysis of Bundesbank foreign exchange intervention provides
additional support for the view that information about intervention operations is
asymmetric among market participants. Peiers finds activity in the DM/$ market around
times of Bundesbank foreign exchange interventions to be consistent with price
leadership by Deutsche Bank. Although it is not known whether Deutsche Bank has an
advantaged position as a counterparty with the Bundesbank, market share and liquidity
considerations imply that such might well be the case. The price leadership hypothesis in
this case would require that the Bundesbank be using Deutsche Bank as a dealer in its
intervention operations, thus granting Deutsche Bank insider information.18
Writing from the FRBNY, Hung (1997) suggests that U.S. intervention,
particularly that which is ‘covert’, might operate through a ‘noise-trading channel’
whereby the central bank utilizes up-to-date information about market conditions and the
reaction functions of the noise-traders. According to this hypothesis, noise traders using
positive feedback rules (including chartists) might incorporate covert intervention into
their trendline and thereby amplify or perpetuate the initial impact of the intervention. In
this story, the initial impact of the intervention is related to its size relative to the volume
of the market in a short-term, flow equilibrium, especially if the market is thin. This
counters the familiar claim that intervention is dwarfed by the approximately $1 trillion
daily turnover in foreign exchange markets.  There are several interesting implications of
this analysis, one being that intervention might seek to increase volatility in order to
discourage ‘one-way speculation’ so as to correct a misalignment of exchange rate level.
Hung’s (1997) hypothesis suggests an important role for the communication between the
central bank and its counterparties.
Consideration of the important role of the U.S. Treasury in U.S. foreign exchange
interventions might provide a qualification to the common assumption that intervention is
a signal of future monetary policy. In fact, the Treasury takes the lead in formulating and
recommending U.S. interventions although since 1962 the Treasury and the Fed have
usually intervened in equal amounts and in the same direction. Operations for both
agencies are conducted at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
13 This apparent
                                                
13  The Federal Reserve System and the Treasury maintain separate accounts for
intervention. A typical intervention is split evenly between both accounts.  Countries
differ on how this responsibility is shared between their central bank and their Ministries
of Finance or the Treasury.19
unanimity of view between the two agencies belies the possibility that intervention
desired by the Treasury, say to support the currency of a major trading partner, might be
at odds with the existing monetary policy stance vis-à-vis the domestic inflationary
impact of a depreciating dollar. The fact that the stated policy of coordinating with the
Treasury might place the monetary policy stance in jeopardy has not been lost on Fed
critics of its involvement in U.S. intervention operations.
V.  Conclusion: State of the Art
Empirical work to date suggests that exchange-market intervention does not
operate through portfolio-balance or by a direct link with future monetary policy.
However, it might sometimes influence market expectations about future fundamentals.
Consequently, exchange-market intervention does not afford policy makers a means with
which to routinely influence exchange rates independent of monetary policy.  Successful
intervention though still requires that monetary authorities have some informational
advantage over private market participants pertinent to the pricing of foreign exchange.
This is likely the rare exception rather than the norm.
Despite important advances in our understanding of intervention, further work is
necessary.  For one thing, we know very little about how the information conveyed by
official foreign exchange transactions filters through the market. The findings of many
studies that intervention increases exchange-rate volatility might be consistent with
several mechanisms for information flow.  More work needs to be done to determine how
long this effect persists, and whether it can be squared with official objectives of calming20
market disorder.  Another unresolved question is whether the manner in which
counterparties are used is of relevance to determining intervention’s efficacy.
Studying the use of technical trading rules appears a promising avenue for
improving the relevance of economists’ modeling of exchange rate determination and it is
possibly that this path will generate new insights into how agents process information
about intervention.  The evidence relating official intervention to the profitability of
technical trading rules suggests further work on the issue of whether private speculators
gain from intervention at the expense of the monetary authorities.
Finally, very few studies have looked at the role of intervention within the overall
macro-policy mix. Despite much evidence on the ineffectiveness of foreign exchange
intervention, authorities appear to view open-market operations conducted through the
foreign exchange market as having a different exchange-rate response than open market
operations undertaken through government securities.21
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